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Abstract
Cancer is a leading cause of death in developed countries, and cancer treatments are the
top category of pharmaceutical spending in the United States and Europe. This paper assesses
whether novel cancer therapies are associated with a reduction in mortality. Using panel data
from 11 developed countries, we study the relationship between mortality attributed to a specific
cancer site and the availability of pharmaceutical treatments. The cross-country and cross-site
variation over time allows us to isolate the decline in mortality attributable to new drugs from
that due to changes in lifestyle and environmental factors. We correct for the endogeneity
of mortality and the availability of new treatments using instrumental variables. On average,
our results show a decline in mortality of 8-9% is associated with the availability of one new
treatment for a cancer site. The gains vary across countries and cancer sites. Based on spending
from 2000-2011, costs per statistical life saved ranged from $11-12K for bladder and liver cancers
to over $150K for cervical, melanoma and stomach cancers. Across countries, Switzerland had
the largest spending per statistical life at approximately $66K, while the UK had the lowest
with $19K.
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1 Introduction
Health spending and outcomes vary significantly across developed countries. The US ranks
26th among OECD countries in life expectancy, despite spending more per person. Cancer is
second only to cardiovascular disease as a cause of death in high income countries, but there is
heterogeneity in the overall burden of cancer as well as in specific cancer sites. For example,
France has an incidence rate of 34.95 for cancer of the lung and 89.7 for breast cancer, compared
to 8.3 and 67.61 in Portugal. In addition, trends in cancer mortality differ across countries and
cancer sites. While the war on cancer has produced significant gains for some cancer sites, these
gains are not realized equally in all countries.
An important question is the role of national policies, particularly regarding access to new
treatments, in driving these outcomes. Recent reports indicate that cancer survival rates in
the UK are below those in the rest of Europe (Angelis and the EUROCARE-5 Working Group
(2014)). One explanation for this outcome is the reluctance of the UK’s National Health Service
to reimburse recent cancer therapies. In contrast, France has rates of uptake of new cancer drugs
that are comparable to those in the US, while Germany falls somewhere in the middle (Jo¨nsson
and Wilking (2007)). In most countries outside the United States, the government plays an
important role in determining the price of new pharmaceutical treatments and in promoting
access to such treatments. Within the US, government insurance programs such as Medicare
as well as private insurers have a clear interest in promoting the appropriate use of the most
effective therapies. However, little work exists to pinpoint specific policies that generate the
differences in health outcomes, and in cancer survival specifically.
We focus on cancer for several reasons. First, cancer is a leading cause of death. Second,
spending on oncology treatments is forecast to exceed $70 billion in developed markets by 2018
(IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics (2014)), making it the largest category of pharmaceu-
tical spending. Whether this spending results in significant health gains is an important policy
issue, particularly since the burden of paying for these treatments generally falls on government
programs. After decades of increases, overall cancer mortality has fallen since the early 1990s
(Cutler (2008)). This improvement coincides with the introduction of many new treatments have
been introduced over the last 20 years, often at controversial price levels (Howard et al. (2015)).
The goal of this work is to quantify the extent to which these treatments caused mortality to
decline.
We are not the first to tackle this issue. Previous work has documented some gains in the war
on cancer, measured either as increased survival or as mortality reduction, and noted differences
in these gains across countries. Several papers link these gains to medical innovations and/or
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spending on cancer care. The role of pharmaceutical treatments in improving outcomes is the
focus of Lichtenberg (2004), Lichtenberg (2010), Lichtenberg (2012) and Lichtenberg (2014),
among others. There is some disagreement about whether, for example, the value of the gains
fully justifies the higher levels of spending in the US compared to Europe (Philipson et al.
(2012), Soneji and Yang (2014)).
We build on these and other papers by exploiting variation in mortality outcomes over time,
across cancer sites, and across 11 countries. Innovations in drug development have not been
equally spread across all cancer sites, and have occurred at different times. Access to these
innovations is not simultaneous across countries, due to regulatory delays and other factors.
Our dataset allows us to control for unobserved factors specific to cancer sites and countries,
as well as site-specific trends, in order to identify the relationship between increased access to
pharmaceutical innovation and changes in cancer mortality. We correct for the endogeneity bias
due to unobserved common drivers of mortality shocks and drug innovation using instrumental
variables.
On average, our results show a decline in mortality of 8-9% is associated with the availability
of one new treatment for a cancer site. The gains vary across countries and cancer sites. Based
on spending from 2000-2011, costs per statistical life saved ranged from $11-12K for bladder
and liver cancers to over $150K for cervical, melanoma and stomach cancers. Across countries,
Switzerland had the largest spending per statistical life at approximately $66K, while the UK
had the lowest with $19K. These estimates are at the lower end of the value of statistical life
estimated in earlier studies (Viscusi and Aldy (2003)).
2 Econometric Methods
2.1 Evaluating the Benefits of Cancer Drugs
There are several approaches to estimating the benefits of cancer treatments. Health technol-
ogy assessments (HTAs), often used by payers to determine whether a treatment should be
reimbursed, are prospective assessments based on the results of clinical trials. The value of a
treatment that yields a median increase in survival of 6 months in a clinical trial can be cal-
culated as half the value of a statistical life-year, for example. However, the use of treatments
in practice may differ from the protocol employed in clinical trials. The population of patients
receiving the treatment is likely to be different, and doctors may not always adhere to recom-
mended dosing. Thus, the clinical gains observed in randomized controlled trials may not be
realized when a treatment is employed more broadly.
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Economists often employ a second approach that estimates the benefits to consumers based
on the preferences revealed by their consumption decisions. That is, economists estimate de-
mand for a treatment, and these estimates allow the calculation of social welfare (or gains from
innovation). Petrin (2002) is an example of this approach in the case of the introduction of
the minivan in the automobile market. An application in pharmaceuticals is Dunn (2012), who
estimates the welfare gains from innovations in cholesterol drugs. This approach can be prob-
lematic in the context of cancer treatments, though. First, patients are unlikely to face the true
price of a treatment due to insurance coverage. Prescribers may be unaware of the true price, or
insensitive to it, or may act as an imperfect agent for patients. Perhaps most importantly, cancer
patients are often close to death. In such situations, assumptions about individual rationality
are likely to be inappropriate.
Most economic studies instead look at an outcome measure such as mortality or survival
in the general population, and examine how this outcome changes with the availability of new
treatments controlling for other factors. Any change in the outcome attributable to cancer
therapies can be compared to spending on these treatments to arrive at an estimate of net
benefits. Examples of papers using this methodology include Lichtenberg (2010), Lakdawalla
et al. (2010), Philipson et al. (2012), and Lichtenberg (2014).
Building on this body of work, we focus on mortality at the cancer site level in a panel of 11
developed countries: Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Two factors motivate our
choice of mortality as an outcome measure. The first is the availability of data across countries
and time periods. While mortality data is available at an annual frequency, EUROCARE
provides recent estimates of country-level survival in Europe only for the entire period of 2000-
2007 (but not annually, which limits the ability to study changes in survival over time). The
second reason for choosing mortality is that it avoids “lead-time bias” that can affect survival
measures. Lead-time bias occurs if, for example, some cancers are diagnosed earlier due to
changes in screening or improvements in diagnostic technologies. Even without any change in
treatment, survival will appear to increase and to be positively correlated with spending due to
longer duration of treatment. 1
1Howard et al. (2016) avoid this problem by restricting their analysis to patients with metastatic cancers in the
US, which should not be affected by changes over time in the stage at which cancers are detected. Lichtenberg
(2015), Lichtenberg (2016b) and Lichtenberg (2016a) study premature cancer mortality (before 75 or 65 years old)
in Canada, Switzerland and Belgium respectively also to avoid the lead-time bias.
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2.2 Identifying the Effects of Drug Introductions on Mortality
We are interested in estimating the treatment effect of the availability of new cancer medications
on mortality rates. In order to identify a causal effect, we need to control for the variation in
other determinants of mortality that could be correlated with the adoption and use of cancer
medications. Our outcome data, which we describe in more detail in the following section,
include annual observations of mortality rates by cancer sites across countries. Similarly, we
have information on the availability and consumption of cancer medications by cancer site,
country, and over time.
These multiple sources of variation are critical for identifying the effect of new treatments.
A pure cross-country analysis on average mortality rates across all cancers is unlikely to be
very informative, given the many country-level healthcare and population characteristics that
can affect mortality. The additional variation across cancers within a country allows us to
control for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Within a cancer, the availability of new
treatments occurs at different times in different countries. Unlike some previous work that
considers only a single country, we use this additional variation across countries to pin down the
effect of a new treatment. Essentially, we use a triple-difference approach that exploits variation
across countries, cancer sites and years, and we address the possible endogeneity of the adoption
of new drugs with instrumental variables as described below.
To be more precise, let yist denote the mortality rate by cancer site s for country i at year t
and assume that the log rate follows:
ln yist = αis + δt + γxist + βdist + εist (2.1)
where αis is a country-cancer site fixed effect, δt is a year effect, xist are variables such as
the incidence of cancer site s in country i in year t, and dist is a variable characterizing the
availability of new drug treatments in year t, such as the number of new drugs approved for
cancer site s in country i and prior to year t, or expenditures on new drug treatments for cancer
site s in country i and year t.
We include year effects (δt) to capture mortality changes over time due to changes in lifestyle
or environmental improvements, such as the removal of asbestos, the reduction in air pollution,
or a decline in smoking. Country-cancer site specific effects (αis) capture unobserved cancer-
and country-specific effects on mortality. For example, a country may have physicians with
particular expertise in treating lung cancer, and this expertise may lower mortality from lung
cancer in that country. Alternatively, surgical interventions may lower the mortality rate for
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certain cancers, and countries may differ in their adoption of such interventions. Controlling
for all of these factors, the parameter β identifies the effect of the availability of new cancer
treatments on mortality provided the error term εist is not correlated with dist.
However, it is quite possible that the availability of new treatments is correlated with other
unobservable factors driving mortality. Pharmaceutical firms could focus more R&D efforts on
cancers with an increasing burden, so that new treatments are more likely to be developed for
cancers with a positive trend in mortality. A country that anticipates a large burden from cancer
in the future may adopt new cancer treatments more quickly. In either case, the availability
of treatments is endogenous, and the βˆ is a biased estimate of the causal effect of drugs on
mortality.
To address these endogeneity issues, we instead estimate (2.1) using instrumental variables,
our choice of which is described in the next section. We assume that we observe variables in a
vector denoted zist correlated with dist but mean independent of εist such that
E (εistzist|αis, δt,xist) = 0 (2.2)
and we then use a two-stages least squares estimation to identify β.
The specification of the availability of new drugs in (2.1) implicitly assumes that take-up of
a new treatment is immediate. In practice, innovations may diffuse more slowly as practitioners
learn more about them. Previous work (e.g., Lichtenberg (2010)) has allowed for a lag in the
adoption of new products. We can do something similar by using dist−τ , where τ is a lag,
instead of dist in equation (2.1). Note that the 2SLS estimate of β using k years of lags for the
instruments and l years of lags for the endogenous right hand side variable is:
βˆlk =
cov (ln yist, zist−k)
cov (dist−l, zist−k)
which implies that
E(βˆlk) = β
cov (dist−τ , zist−k)
cov (dist−l, zist−k)
If l 6= τ , E(βˆlk) varies over k provided the covariance between dist−l and zist−k is not constant
over lags k (which is a testable assumption) and, as E(βˆτk) = β, all βˆτk are consistent estimates
of β for all k provided the instrumental variable condition (2.2) is valid. This means that the
estimate of β will not vary significantly with lags of the instruments in the 2SLS estimates only
if we use the right number of years as lag for dist−l. Moreover, if the variables zist and dist
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always have a maximum correlation when contemporaneous such that
|cov (dist′ , zist)| ≤ |cov (dist, zist)| for any t, t′
then τ is the number of lag years l that minimizes the absolute value of E(βˆlτ ), that is |E(βˆττ )| ≤
|E(βˆlτ )| for all l, which is a testable assumption.
While we believe this approach has many advantages, we do not attempt to evaluate the
relative contribution of drug innovation compared to other types of changes in health technology,
such as imaging or equipment innovation, which is possible with additional data (Lichtenberg
(2012) or Lichtenberg (2014)). We only try to identify whether drug treatments have led to
cancer mortality reductions, and by how much. In addition, this is a retrospective analysis,
which limits its use in pricing decisions going forward.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Sources of data
3.1.1 Incidence
Our information on cancer incidence is provided by the International Agency from Research
on Cancer (IARC) of the World Health Organization (WHO).2 Incidence is measured as the
number of new cases arising in a given period in a specified population, collected routinely by
cancer registries. It can be expressed as an absolute number of cases per year or as a rate per
100,000 persons per year, and it approximates the average risk of developing a cancer. The data
provide annual measures of the total number of cases and the rate of each of 38 cancer sites by
country, sex, and age group.
Because age has powerful influence on risk of cancer and age distributions vary across coun-
tries, we calculate age-adjusted standardized rates of incidence (ASIR). The ASIR is a weighted
mean of the age-specific rates, where weights are from a selected population distribution, such
as the World Standard Population or European standard.3 These rates allow us to compare
incidence rates across countries independent of differences in their age distributions and their
demographic changes over time. Throughout this paper, we use the European standard; all
results are robust to using the World standard.
2Data are available from the IARC database at http://eco.iarc.fr/EUREG/AnalysisT.aspx.
3See IARC documentation at http://eco.iarc.fr/EUREG/Glossary.aspx.
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Ideally, we would use the stock of patients per cancer site, rather than the flow of newly
diagnosed patients. This flow omits the stock of patients who survived from the previous year,
and who may continue to consume pharmaceutical treatments. This omission will appear in the
error term in our regressions, and may therefore bias our coefficient estimates of β if correlated
with the number of new drugs used per cancer site and by country. However, our instrumental
variables strategy will also correct for this omitted variable problem of patient stocks, provided
the instruments zist also satisfy condition (2.2) when εist includes omitted past stock of patients.
3.1.2 Mortality
We use data on mortality from the WHO.4 The WHO Mortality Data base comprises deaths
registered in national vital registration systems, with underlying cause of death defined as “the
disease or injury which initiated the train of morbid events leading directly to death, or the
circumstances of the accident or violence which produced the fatal injury” in accordance with
the rules of the International Classification of Diseases. The data includes the number of deaths
by country, year, sex, age group and cause of death in addition to the population in each one of
these categories. Our conversion from ICD9 and ICD10 codes to the cancer sites for which we
have incidence data is based on information provided by EUREG.5
For a specific tumor site and population (by age and gender), we compute a crude mortality
rate by dividing the number of cancer deaths observed during a given year by the corresponding
population, expressed as an annual rate per 100,000 persons at risk. We then calculate age-
standardized mortality rates (ASMR), using the same method described for incidence.
3.1.3 Pharmaceutical data
We include information on all drugs approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), the European Medicines Agency (EMA), or other European national regulators that are
recommended for at least one cancer site. This set includes treatments with four mechanisms of
action. Antineoplastic drugs block the development of neoplasms. Cytostatic drugs, including
hormone therapies, block receptors on cancer cells to stop them from growing, but do not kill
them. Immunostimulants boost the immune system to help fight cancer. Finally, interferons are
biological response modifiers that slow tumor growth by interfering with cancer cell division.
These drugs can be used in combination, both with other drugs as well as with radiation and
4Data can be downloaded from the WHO Mortality website http://www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/mortality rawdata/en/.
5See EUREG dictionary at http://eco.iarc.fr/eureg/Dictionary.aspx.
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surgery. New treatments in each of these categories have been introduced since 1990, and our
analysis focuses on these.6
For country-level information on the use of specific cancer drugs, we use the MIDAS dataset
from IMS Health. This provides quarterly revenues and the number of units sold for each
molecule in each country from 2000 to 2013. We combine revenues and units across all pre-
sentations of a drug within a country, and all revenues are converted into 2013 US dollars. In
addition, we have the initial launch date for each cancer drug in each of the countries in our
dataset, as well as the launch dates of non-cancer drugs.
We match each drug to the specific cancer site(s) it targets using three sources of information.
The National Cancer Institute (NCI) provides information on drugs approved by the FDA for
each type of cancer.7 We consulted the Merck Manual to verify the recommended treatments
for each cancer site. From the EMA, we record the date at which each drug received approval
from the EMA for a specific cancer.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for our sample of drugs of the number of cancer sites
for which they are approved treatments, where the unit of observation is a single drug. About
two-thirds are relatively new, which we define as having an initial global launch date after 1990.
On average, the newer drugs are used for just over 2 different cancer sites. Often, additional
uses for a drug are discovered over time. In our data, we observe that older drugs treat a larger
number of sites, on average, than more recent products. This may reflect the longer period of
time for which new uses have been researched, as well as the possibility that older drugs are less
likely to be targeted therapies. The drugs that treat the highest number of cancer sites are (for
newer drugs) paclitaxel and (for older drugs) fluorouracil; both are on the WHO list of essential
medicines.8
Table 3.1: Summary of cancer drugs
Number of treated cancer sites
N Mean SD Min Max
Newer drugs 90 2.133 1.973 1 10
Older drugs 48 3.917 3.201 1 15
The available arsenal of drugs to treat cancer varies considerably by site. In Table 3.2, we
provide a summary of new drugs by site over the 1990-2013 period. Breast cancer and leukaemia
have seen the largest number of treatments introduced. Some cancer sites have had very few
6We include only drugs in the ATC “L” category. This excludes recent introductions of HPV vaccines, for
example, which reduce the incidence of cervical cancer. The effects on mortality should appear indirectly through
the reduction in incidence.
7See NCI drug information at http://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/drugs/cancer-type.
8See WHO Essential Medicines website at http://www.who.int/selection medicines/list/en/.
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new treatments since 1990, including bladder, Hodgkin lymphoma, skin melanoma, soft tissue
cancers or liver cancers. The availability of new treatments also varies by country, as we show
in Table 3.3. Most newer cancer drugs are eventually launched in our sample of countries, as we
would expect given their relatively high income. On average, large markets such as the US, UK
and France have more treatments per cancer site-year than smaller countries such as Croatia,
Sweden, and Ireland.
Table 3.2: Summary of new drugs by cancer site across countries/years
Cancer Mean Min Max
Bladder 0.01 0 1
Breast 6.36 0 13
CNS 2.13 0 5
Cervix uteri 0.81 0 2
Colon 2.70 0 6
Hodgkin lymphoma 0.01 0 1
Kidney 1.03 0 6
Leukaemia 3.87 0 13
Liver 0.23 0 1
Lung 4.32 0 10
Multiple myeloma 0.40 0 3
Non-Hodgkin lymphoma 1.31 0 9
Ovary 2.33 0 4
Pancreas 2.46 0 5
Prostate 1.64 0 5
Rectum 1.36 0 4
Skin melanoma 0.02 0 2
Soft tissue 0.03 0 1
Stomach 2.76 0 5
Testis 0.57 0 1
Thyroid gland 0.23 0 1
Table 3.3: Summary of new drugs by country across cancer sites/years
Country Mean Min Max
US 1.13 0 13
Austria 0.95 0 12
Croatia 0.69 0 9
Czech Republic 0.77 0 9
France 1.03 0 11
Germany 1.03 0 12
Ireland 0.83 0 10
Norway 0.89 0 10
Sweden 0.94 0 12
Switzerland 0.94 0 11
UK 0.91 0 11
We use this information to construct measures of the availability of new treatments by cancer,
country, and year. The simplest measure is the cumulative number of new treatments for cancer
site s launched in country i as of year t, for which we have information from 1990-present.
10
However, this measure does not capture the intensity of use: a new treatment may be launched,
but not widely adopted by oncologists, for example.
We have an alternative measure for the period 2000-2013, which is spending on new and old
cancer treatments in country i in year t. However, our data does not distinguish between sales
for different cancer sites for treatments that can be used for multiple cancers. We thus allocate
sales across cancer sites within a country using the relative incidence for each gender of each
cancer site for which a drug may be used. For example, bevacizumab (Avastin®) treats colon
cancer as well as lung, renal, and ovarian cancer. If ovarian cancer accounts for 10% of the total
cases for women across these four cancers in a particular country, we assign 10% of the sales
to ovarian cancer. We do not attempt to allocate sales by gender or age, although access to
treatments may vary across both in some countries, depending on health insurance and other
aspects of the health care system.9
3.1.4 Additional measures
Health outcomes depend on many other factors beyond incidence and pharmaceuticals, of course.
Access to physicians, the availability of diagnostic equipment, insurance coverage, and other
characteristics of the health system in each country are likely to be important determinants of
mortality. While some data is provided by sources such as the OECD, annual observations of
these variables are not consistently available for all countries in our study. Our econometric
specification includes country-cancer fixed effects, which should absorb most of the variation
associated with omitting them.
3.2 Instruments
As explained previously, candidate instruments are variables that are correlated with the avail-
ability and usage of new treatments for a specific cancer in a particular country, but which do
not otherwise affect mortality from that cancer in that country. One such instrument is provided
by the variation in the launch times of a new treatment for each cancer in each country. In the
case of Europe, the EMA provides a centralized procedure for approval throughout EU member
states. However, the approval date may differ from the launch date for two reasons. While EMA
approval gives a pharmaceutical firm the authorization to sell its product throughout the EU,
typically the firm must negotiate pricing and reimbursement with each national government.
These negotiations may be lengthy and often require additional clinical data to demonstrate
9While we also have information on “standard units” (which IMS defines as the smallest common dose of a
product formulation, i.e. a tablet, capsule, ampoule, etc.), units do not correspond to doses, and recommended doses
vary across treatments (and within treatments across cancers).
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cost-effectiveness. This is likely to be correlated with a country’s inclination to adopt a new
cancer treatment for site s as well as the difficulty of negotiating pricing and reimbursement in
that country. We use the average launch delay for non-cancer drugs, i.e. the number of years
between a drug’s first global launch and its introduction in country i, as an instrument for the
availability of new cancer drugs. A second candidate instrument is the cumulative number of
new non-cancer drugs approved in a specific country in year t. Note that the availability of
non-cancer drugs should have no direct effect on mortality from cancer in a country. These
instruments vary across countries and over time, but not across cancer sites within a country.
Finally, we also exploit the fact that countries must import at least some of the pharma-
ceutical treatments used there. Fluctuations in currency valuations should affect local prices
and consumption of imported pharmaceuticals, but have no direct effect on cancer mortality.
Our sample of 11 countries includes 8 different currencies: the US dollar, the Euro, the Swiss
franc, the British pound, the Swedish krona, the Czech koruna, the Norwegian krone, and the
Croatian kuna. We include each country’s average annual exchange rate with the Euro and with
the US dollar as additional instruments for specifications using spending.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.4 provides an overview of incidence and mortality associated with cancer sites across
countries. Both incidence and mortality are presented as age-standardized using the European
age distribution. Within our sample of countries, incidence is lowest in France, with an average
of 9.25 new cases per 100,000 per year, and highest in Ireland at 15.67. Mortality ranges from
4.35 per 100,000 in Switzerland to 6.65 per 100,000 in the Czech Republic. In most countries,
prostate cancer has the highest incidence and lung cancer is the most deadly.
Table 3.4: Cancer incidence and mortality, by country
Mean Cancer with highest
Country Incidence Mortality Incidence Mortality
US 13.30 4.89 Prostate Lung
Austria 11.41 5.16 Prostate Lung
Croatia 11.20 5.95 Lung Lung
Czech Republic 15.37 6.65 Other skin Lung
France 9.25 5.04 Prostate Lung
Germany 13.59 5.17 Prostate Lung
Ireland 15.67 5.57 Other skin Lung
Norway 11.49 4.90 Prostate Lung
Sweden 10.88 4.47 Prostate Prostate
Switzerland 12.42 4.35 Prostate Lung
UK 12.47 5.19 Breast Lung
Incidence and mortality rates are per 100,000 and age-adjusted
using European weights.
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The last two decades have seen an overall drop in cancer mortality, even after controlling
for changes in incidence. To show this, in Figure 3.1 we plot the coefficients on year dummy
variables from a simple regression of mortality on incidence, i.e. equation (2.1) without any
measure of the availability of new treatments. However, the gains against cancer vary greatly
by cancer site. For example, mortality from leukaemia shows a notable downward trend (see
Figure 3.2). In contrast, we see few improvements in pancreatic cancer (see Figure 3.3). In
the regression analysis, our goal is to determine how much change in cancer mortality can be
attributed specifically to the availability of new pharmaceutical treatments.
Figure 3.1: Cancer mortality trend
Figure 3.2: Trend in mortality from leukaemia
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Figure 3.3: Trend in mortality from pancreatic cancer
Summary statistics for the variables used in our regression analysis are presented in Table
3.5. In the regressions, we use logs of age-standardized incidence and mortality. In specifications
that include spending on treatments sold, we also take logs. We have fewer observations for
spending, as our information for these variables begin only in 2000.
Table 3.5: Summary statistics for regressions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Log mortality rate 0.68 1.78 -5.75 5.88 25900
Log incidence rate 1.67 1.57 -3 6.42 17548
Nb new drugs 1.39 3.97 0 62 26620
Log(spend), new 4.16 5.16 0 17.71 13310
Log(spend), old 4.95 4.03 0 16.02 13310
New non-cancer drugs in country 313.15 218.81 10 1287 26620
Average launch delay for non-cancer drugs (years) 0.49 0.24 0 1.16 26620
4 Results
We first estimate equation (2.1) using the number of new drugs (defined as drugs approved since
1990) as the measure dist of the usage of new treatments. Appendix A.2 presents empirical re-
sults that allow for a lag in the adoption of new drugs. We focus our discussion on specifications
with no lags, as they provide a conservative lower bounds of the effects of new drugs on mortal-
ity.10 Table 4.1 contains results for two specifications for each of three samples: men and women
10Results with lags yield significant estimates with up to 6 years of lags for the instruments for several variants
with lags of the endogenous variables. The preferred number of lag years seems to be 4, but it is not possible to
statistically reject 0, 1, 2 or 3 years of lag. The minimum absolute value of the β coefficient is when τ is 0.
14
combined, men only, and women only. The first specification assumes exogeneity of dist, and
the second instruments for dist using the instrument variables described in section 3.2. Results
from the first stage of the IV specifications are included in the Appendix B. All specifications
exploit the panel nature of our data with country-cancer site fixed effects and also include year
fixed effects; these are not reported in the tables, but are statistically significant.
Our main focus is on the relationship between the use of new treatments and mortality. We
estimate a negative and statistically significant coefficient in all specifications. As expected, the
coefficient is larger in magnitude when we use instrumental variables, showing that the error
term εist is positively correlated with dist in equation (2.1) and leads to an underestimation of
the mortality reduction effect of new drugs when using OLS. The number of older drugs has a
statistically insignificant coefficient. Our results suggest that one additional new treatment for a
cancer in a country is associated with a decrease in the mortality rate of -12% for both genders,
-8% for men, and -9% for women. Because several cancers are gender specific, the average effect
is not the average effect on the subset of common cancer sites across genders.
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Table 4.1: Results using count of new drugs as dependent variable
Both Men Women
Panel Panel IV Panel Panel IV Panel Panel IV
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Nb new drugs 0.007∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗ 0.002 −0.093∗∗
(0.003) (0.037) (0.004) (0.040) (0.004) (0.039)
Incidence x Austria 0.493∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.054) (0.050) (0.055) (0.049) (0.056)
Incidence x Croatia 0.100 0.130 0.219∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.153∗ 0.167∗∗
(0.083) (0.093) (0.086) (0.092) (0.080) (0.084)
Incidence x Czech Republic 0.129 0.070 0.241∗∗ 0.204∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.149
(0.097) (0.110) (0.107) (0.114) (0.090) (0.097)
Incidence x France −0.048 −0.030 0.053 0.077 −0.011 −0.016
(0.044) (0.050) (0.049) (0.052) (0.049) (0.052)
Incidence x Germany 0.455∗∗∗ 0.326∗ 0.424∗∗ 0.317∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗
(0.167) (0.192) (0.176) (0.192) (0.139) (0.147)
Incidence x Ireland 0.297∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.054) (0.050) (0.053) (0.048) (0.050)
Incidence x Norway 0.337∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.058) (0.051) (0.055) (0.050) (0.053)
Incidence x Sweden 0.409∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.086) (0.079) (0.084) (0.073) (0.079)
Incidence x Switzerland 0.099 0.084 0.155∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.075 0.084
(0.070) (0.079) (0.063) (0.067) (0.056) (0.059)
Incidence x UK 0.437∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.137
(0.081) (0.103) (0.091) (0.109) (0.100) (0.116)
Incidence x US 0.441∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.075) (0.063) (0.076) (0.074) (0.079)
N 6028 6028 5382 5382 5521 5521
Fixed effects
Country*Cancer Country*Cancer Country*Cancer
Year Year Year
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p< .01.
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As expected, incidence is an important determinant of cancer mortality. In all specifications,
the coefficient on log age-standardized incidence rate is positive and significant. We interact
the incidence rate with country dummies in order to allow the elasticity of mortality rate to
incidence to be country specific. Taking the IV results as our preferred estimates, on average
we find an “elasticity” of cancer mortality to cancer incidence of 0.32 for men, while it is 0.26
for women. The coefficient estimates vary across countries. The US, UK, Sweden, Norway,
Ireland, Germany and Austria have the largest elasticities of mortality to incidence. The largest
differences in elasticities between men and women are in the US and UK.
As noted previously, mortality rates from cancer have declined, on average, during the two
decades of our study. Pharmaceutical innovation is hardly the only change that occurred during
this period. For example, changes in lifestyle may have reduced incidence and therefore mortal-
ity. To assess the relative importance of the availability of treatments compared to changes in
incidence, we compute the average increase in the number of drug treatments and the average
change in incidence across all cancers within a country, and calculate the change in the num-
ber of deaths implied by our regression results. Table 4.2 presents this summary by country,
with the total change in mortality for comparison. Given that the sensitivity of mortality to
incidence varies considerably across countries, it is not surprising that the relative importance
of innovation and incidence is also heterogeneous. Drug innovation accounted for 10-30% of the
total number of lives saved, and is always more important than changes in incidence.
Table 4.2: Comparison of innovation vs. incidence, Men and Women
ASMR Changes in Lives (1000s)
1990 2011 Total from drugs from incidence
Austria 6.01 4.19 -153.61 -19.35 -18.27
Croatia 5.84 5.94 5.00 -6.76 -2.52
Czech Republic 7.34 5.21 -224.86 -17.57 -2.23
France 5.76 4.22 -974.45 -161.30 11.22
Germany 5.74 4.52 -1003.38 -211.66 -47.26
Ireland 6.19 5.12 -49.93 -9.08 -7.65
Norway 5.14 4.54 -29.48 -9.82 -8.14
Sweden 4.97 4.09 -82.98 -21.15 -11.58
Switzerland 4.91 3.94 -76.51 -17.46 -2.58
UK 6.09 4.58 -952.78 -137.18 -51.74
US 5.49 4.08 -4427.66 -934.06 -349.39
Notes: Changes in thousands of lives by country between 1990 and 2011.
While the approval and launch of a drug mean that it is a treatment option for a cancer
site in a country-year, our measure of the number of new drugs per cancer-country does not
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capture differences in the intensity of use. Many factors can affect this. Insurers may restrict
the use of new treatments in order to control expenses. Oncologists must be aware of new
treatment options and adjust their practice to incorporate their use. It is possible that in some
cases, physicians prescribe new treatments even when they are unlikely to be effective, perhaps
because dying patients are desperate. To address differences in the use of new treatments across
cancers, countries, and years, we estimate regressions using information on expenses. We allow
old and new drugs, introduced before or after 1990, to potentially have different effects on
mortality.
In Table 4.3, we present the results from specifications using the log of expenditures in
country i for cancer site s in year t. We have a shorter time period over which to identify
effects, since we only have data on expenditures since 2000. In addition, our data do not allow
us to observe which cancer sites a specific drug was prescribed to treat, nor do we know whether
use of treatments is the same for both genders. This measurement error is likely to introduce
an attenuation bias.
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Table 4.3: Results using Log spending
Both Men Women
Panel Panel IV Panel Panel IV Panel Panel IV
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log(spend), new 0.001 0.092∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.096∗∗∗ −0.003 0.068∗∗
(0.002) (0.029) (0.003) (0.034) (0.003) (0.033)
Log(spend), old 0.003 −0.073 −0.012 −0.089 0.005 −0.015
(0.008) (0.056) (0.011) (0.078) (0.011) (0.069)
Incidence x Austria 0.569∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.087) (0.074) (0.093) (0.080) (0.091)
Incidence x Croatia 0.160 0.105 0.118 0.115 0.182 0.143
(0.164) (0.211) (0.160) (0.193) (0.124) (0.141)
Incidence x Czech Republic 0.110 0.161 0.256∗∗ 0.282∗∗ 0.110 0.187∗
(0.085) (0.111) (0.101) (0.122) (0.088) (0.106)
Incidence x France 0.185∗∗∗ 0.044 0.187∗∗ 0.024 0.157∗ 0.087
(0.066) (0.098) (0.074) (0.109) (0.082) (0.097)
Incidence x Germany 0.449∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.183) (0.142) (0.188) (0.114) (0.141)
Incidence x Ireland 0.284∗ 0.225 0.375∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.208) (0.139) (0.168) (0.130) (0.146)
Incidence x Norway 0.023 −0.024 0.310∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ −0.133∗ −0.129
(0.074) (0.097) (0.075) (0.094) (0.076) (0.085)
Incidence x Sweden 0.483∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.124) (0.091) (0.126) (0.085) (0.103)
Incidence x Switzerland −0.048 −0.085 0.015 −0.048 0.015 0.022
(0.072) (0.094) (0.075) (0.097) (0.056) (0.062)
Incidence x UK 0.440∗∗∗ 0.304 0.412∗∗ 0.342 0.313 0.186
(0.153) (0.202) (0.172) (0.210) (0.207) (0.241)
Incidence x US 0.305∗∗∗ −0.288 0.295∗∗∗ −0.190 0.259∗∗ −0.215
(0.092) (0.225) (0.103) (0.218) (0.127) (0.262)
N 3318 3318 2964 2964 3035 3035
Fixed effects
Country*Cancer Country*Cancer Country*Cancer
Year Year Year
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p< .01.
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In contrast to our results on the number of approved drugs, we find a positive relationship
between spending on new drugs and mortality. Results from the previous specifications sug-
gested that the endogeneity of access to innovation and mortality caused a positive bias in OLS
estimates. Our instruments do not perform as well for spending as for the number of approved
drugs, so the IV estimates may reflect a similar upward bias. However, there are several ad-
ditional explanations for why we might not find a negative relationship between spending and
mortality.
First, spending reflects both prices and quantities. With the exception of the US, all the
countries we examine use some form of price control. If the intensity of use of each new drug
were identical across all countries in our sample, spending would still vary across countries due
to price differences, but differences driven solely by price would not change mortality.
A second possibility is that differences in efficacy of treatments for different cancers are not
reflected in their prices or in treatment guidelines, resulting in a suboptimal mix of products used
in practice. Within a country, we might find no relationship between spending and mortality if
spending is distorted towards less effective treatments.
Finally, overuse of treatments may be an important factor. Many cancer patients are close
to death, and physicians may feel ethically obligated to try treatments that have a very low
(but non-zero) chance of helping. This behavior would tend to drive up spending without a
significant improvement in mortality rates.
These explanations may vary in salience across countries. Prices and access policies can be
very different, and their role in ensuring the appropriate use of treatments merits additional
study. While our data do not permit this detailed analysis, the availability of patient and
physician level information may allow such studies in the future.
5 Evaluating the Gains from Innovation
5.1 Counterfactual Mortality
We are interested in the mortality a country would have experienced had access to drug inno-
vation been different. The reduced-form nature of our analysis limits our ability to implement
a complete counterfactual that would account for changes in the use of substitute treatments,
prices, etc. However, we can arrive at a rough estimate of the change in mortality that can be
attributed to the availability of new treatments, and compare this to expenditures on those new
treatments.
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We proceed as follows. For any counterfactual number of new drugs d∗ist instead of dist, we
calculate the predicted mortality rates based on our regression results. That is, we compute the
counterfactual mortality rate as
ln y∗ist = αis + δt + γxist + βd
∗
ist + εist
= ln yist − β (dist − d∗ist)
This is similar to the approach used in Lichtenberg (2012) to estimate the contribution
of drug innovation to mortality reduction in Germany and France. In doing so, we assume
that the total population Pit does not change due to different mortality rates in all years prior
to t in the counterfactual situation. Evaluating such changes in population would require us
to account for age-specific competing risks and survival rates that would be observed in the
counterfactual scenario. As seen in Appendix A, with this simplifying assumption, we can
convert the counterfactual mortality rates into an estimate of the number of deaths z∗ist by
cancer site s for each year t and country i as
z∗ist = y
∗
ist ∗ P ∗it
where P ∗it is the total population in country i in year t. Everything else equal, the total number
of lives saved in year t is then zist − z∗ist = (yist ∗ Pit − y∗ist ∗ P ∗it) and can then be compared to
the observed total spending on new drugs.
5.2 Counterfactual 1: No Innovation After 2000
The first counterfactual we consider is a scenario in which no new cancer treatments are launched
after 2000 (which is the first year in which we observe drug spending). We compute the average
difference in the observed mortality and that predicted using the number of new treatments for
each cancer site in each country as of 1999 for all years after 2000 across all countries in our
sample, and convert this to a change in the number of lives. Table 5.1 shows the average across
countries within cancer sites of these, with the observed ASIR in column 2, the observed and
counterfactual ASMR in columns 3 and 4, the number of lives saved in column 5 (in 1000s),
and the total expenditures observed for drugs launched after 2000 in column 6 (in 1000s of US
dollars). The last column has the cost per life saved as the total expenditures on new drugs
divided by the number of lives saved (in 1000s of US dollars). This can also be interpreted as
the value of a statistical life that would justify those expenditures.
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Table 5.1: Counterfactual 1 by cancer, Men and Women
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Bladder 14.75 4.40 4.41 0.75 9.10 12.13
Bone 1.06 0.56 0.56 0.00 8.23 .
Breast 53.74 13.77 16.00 219.31 3425.07 15.62
CNS 6.92 5.31 6.24 60.58 1906.90 31.48
Cervix uteri 9.62 2.91 3.02 4.50 893.84 198.69
Colon 30.26 13.71 15.49 171.43 8964.43 52.29
Corpus uteri 17.38 2.43 2.43 0.00 0.00 .
Endocrine glands 0.52 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.00 .
Eye 0.87 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.00 .
Gallbladder 3.35 2.37 2.37 0.00 0.00 .
Hodgkin lymphoma 2.43 0.37 0.37 0.27 14.17 53.30
Kidney 12.86 4.98 6.29 107.35 6160.59 57.39
Larynx 3.85 1.51 1.51 0.00 0.00 .
Leukaemia 10.32 5.55 7.73 291.62 12177.81 41.76
Lip 0.77 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 .
Liver 6.35 5.45 5.73 25.10 276.06 11.00
Lung 45.81 37.03 43.44 862.11 22595.70 26.21
Multiple myeloma 4.95 2.97 3.26 32.90 1633.45 49.65
Non-Hodgkin lymphoma 12.79 4.85 5.52 120.15 4686.57 39.01
Nose & sinuses 0.64 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.00 .
Oesophagus 5.50 4.51 4.51 -0.00 0.00 .
Oral cavity 2.35 0.76 0.76 0.00 0.00 .
Other female sites 3.47 3.14 3.14 0.00 0.00 .
Other skin 57.26 0.64 0.64 -0.00 5.74 .
Ovary 13.56 8.93 8.98 2.45 81.01 33.02
Pancreas 10.55 10.28 12.41 129.98 2283.69 17.57
Penis 1.09 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.00 .
Pharynx 4.35 2.08 2.08 0.00 0.00 .
Prostate 110.33 26.50 26.99 31.05 762.63 24.56
Rectum 19.32 7.05 7.85 52.04 4670.00 89.74
Salivary glands 0.86 0.26 0.26 -0.00 0.00 .
Skin melanoma 15.80 2.80 2.82 2.47 391.02 158.36
Small intestine 1.49 0.47 0.47 -0.00 0.00 .
Soft tissue 2.66 0.97 0.98 0.65 30.26 46.56
Stomach 11.47 7.43 8.57 59.48 9466.23 159.14
Testis 7.05 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 .
Thyroid gland 5.98 0.53 0.56 2.04 254.22 124.81
Tongue 2.27 0.89 0.89 0.00 0.00 .
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We find very large differences across cancer sites. Some cancers had no new drug introduc-
tions after 2000, so there is no change in mortality and no spending on new drugs. In a few cases
of very low-incidence cancers, the change in lives saved is very small, and we indicate the cost
per life saved as missing because the calculation is unlikely to be reliable. Among the others,
the highest cost per life saved are for colon, testis, small intestine and tongue cancers, between
$100,000 and $200,000. To put these figures into perspective, a report prepared by the Office of
Management and Budget in the US in 2003 stated that estimates of the VSL ranged between
$1 and $10 million.11
Table 5.2 provides a corresponding set of estimates using averages within each country, across
cancer sites. Once again, there is substantial heterogeneity, with the UK at the low end (around
$19,000) and Switzerland at the high end (around $66,000).
Table 5.2: Counterfactual 1 by country, Men and Women
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Austria 12.33 4.66 5.28 22.89 1198.72 52.37
Croatia 11.55 5.91 6.21 5.92 197.14 33.29
Czech Republic 16.00 6.09 6.42 15.75 596.02 37.85
France 10.93 4.57 5.39 229.07 10042.25 43.84
Germany 14.17 4.73 5.36 225.73 9685.65 42.91
Ireland 17.02 5.28 5.66 7.58 371.75 49.04
Norway 13.36 4.86 5.20 7.39 277.38 37.55
Sweden 12.44 4.47 4.93 19.29 853.25 44.23
Switzerland 13.37 4.23 4.76 18.28 1210.50 66.22
UK 13.45 4.80 5.33 135.88 2583.57 19.01
US 12.16 4.49 5.58 1488.46 53680.46 36.06
5.3 Counterfactual 2: No Launch Delays After 2000
An alternative counterfactual that we consider removes all launch delays across countries for
new cancer drugs post-2000. That is, we take development times for each drug as given, but
we assume that a drug is available immediately in all countries following its first introduction
anywhere. Launch delays typically result from lengthy pricing and reimbursement negotiations
within countries, or differences between the regulatory requirements of the US FDA and the
EMA. While the calculation of lives saved is straightforward, as in the previous scenario, we
have to make additional assumptions in order to estimate what spending on new drugs would
have been. We compute the average spending per new drug, per year, and multiply this by the
total number of drug-years in the absence of launch delays. The difference between this figure
11See OMB report at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory matters pdf/a-
4.pdf.
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and the true spending is an approximation of the additional spending a country would have
from earlier introductions.
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 contain the estimates of lives saved, spending, and the average cost per life
for this scenario. Results are generally similar. Costs per life are somewhat lower at the country
level, while at the cancer level they are even more dispersed than in the previous counterfactual.
Recall that we assume spending on each additional new drug is “average,” which may be very
different than true spending on the marginal drug. The marginal additional drug introduced
may be much more expensive than the average, while its marginal mortality reduction effect
can also be different than the average.
Table 5.3: Counterfactual 2 by cancer, Men and Women
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Bladder 14.75 4.40 4.33 -4.32 90.96 21.06
Bone 1.06 0.56 0.56 0.00 8.23 .
Breast 53.74 13.77 12.06 -62.76 439.11 7.00
CNS 6.92 5.31 4.94 -15.18 333.71 21.98
Cervix uteri 9.62 2.91 2.76 -2.26 305.21 135.05
Colon 30.26 13.71 12.54 -26.79 1686.05 62.95
Corpus uteri 17.38 2.43 2.43 0.00 0.00 .
Endocrine glands 0.52 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.00 .
Eye 0.87 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.00 .
Gallbladder 3.35 2.37 2.37 0.00 0.00 .
Hodgkin lymphoma 2.43 0.37 0.37 -0.18 141.70 777.86
Kidney 12.86 4.98 4.45 -15.72 3092.67 196.74
Larynx 3.85 1.51 1.51 0.00 0.00 .
Leukaemia 10.32 5.55 3.97 -31.81 6562.13 206.26
Lip 0.77 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 .
Liver 6.35 5.45 5.34 -2.20 110.42 50.09
Lung 45.81 37.03 30.51 -172.49 6460.02 37.45
Multiple myeloma 4.95 2.97 2.75 -4.25 1515.57 356.85
Non-Hodgkin lymphoma 12.79 4.85 3.67 -31.99 5985.65 187.11
Nose & sinuses 0.64 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.00 .
Oesophagus 5.50 4.51 4.51 -0.00 0.00 .
Oral cavity 2.35 0.76 0.76 0.00 0.00 .
Other female sites 3.47 3.14 3.14 0.00 0.00 .
Other skin 57.26 0.64 0.64 -0.00 5.74 .
Ovary 13.56 8.93 8.57 -7.91 10.15 1.28
Pancreas 10.55 10.28 9.92 -27.01 211.73 7.84
Penis 1.09 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.00 .
Pharynx 4.35 2.08 2.08 0.00 0.00 .
Prostate 110.33 26.50 25.61 -9.43 114.26 12.12
Rectum 19.32 7.05 6.34 -17.98 1847.09 102.75
Salivary glands 0.86 0.26 0.26 -0.00 0.00 .
Skin melanoma 15.80 2.80 2.76 -1.02 1329.46 1309.11
Small intestine 1.49 0.47 0.47 -0.00 0.00 .
Soft tissue 2.66 0.97 0.94 -2.23 159.93 71.72
Stomach 11.47 7.43 7.27 -1.02 215.90 211.86
Testis 7.05 0.38 0.36 -0.07 0.00 .
Thyroid gland 5.98 0.53 0.52 -0.20 101.69 517.05
Tongue 2.27 0.89 0.89 0.00 0.00 .
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Table 5.4: Counterfactual 2 by country, Men and Women
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Austria 12.33 4.66 4.37 -10.54 284.79 27.01
Croatia 11.55 5.91 4.94 -18.36 166.56 9.07
Czech Republic 16.00 6.09 5.32 -35.14 357.85 10.18
France 10.93 4.57 4.35 -59.58 1375.26 23.08
Germany 14.17 4.73 4.44 -103.96 1485.79 14.29
Ireland 17.02 5.28 4.73 -10.65 162.10 15.22
Norway 13.36 4.86 4.38 -9.82 100.52 10.23
Sweden 12.44 4.47 4.13 -12.97 231.34 17.84
Switzerland 13.37 4.23 3.95 -9.05 316.03 34.91
UK 13.45 4.80 4.32 -117.37 814.29 6.94
US 12.16 4.49 4.45 -49.36 1738.36 35.22
A shortcoming of both counterfactuals is that we do not consider what spending on older
drugs would have been, nor do we model how additional competition from new introductions
would affect negotiated prices. Our estimates are not directly comparable to those produced
in studies with different samples or methodologies. For example, a recent paper examining
cancer treatments in the US (Howard et al. (2016)) exploits more detailed patient-level data on
treatments and costs. The sample considered is restricted to Medicare recipients who are good
candidates for drug treatment. In contrast, our study relies on national-level data by cancer
site, corresponding to the entire population.
6 Conclusion
Using time-series data on mortality at the level of cancer site in 11 countries, we find that
the availability of relatively novel cancer therapies is associated with a statistically significant,
and economically important, reduction in mortality. We also demonstrate that the gains from
new drugs vary across cancer sites and across countries. Estimates from two counterfactual
scenarios, involving either the removal of all innovation after 2000 or the removal of all launch
delays, suggest that the implied VSL from spending on new cancer drugs generally falls in the
range of estimates used by many regulatory agencies for policy evaluation. Thus, while the high
prices of novel cancer treatments are often criticized as excessive, they are not inconsistent with
standards used in other settings.
Our approach is likely to underestimate the “true” benefits or overestimate the cost per life if
expensive cancer treatments are frequently used inappropriately. Inappropriate use might arise
for many reasons: physician agency issues, marketing efforts that encourage overuse, a lack of
diagnostic tests for selecting the best treatment based on a patient’s characteristics, a “Hail
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Mary” attempt to treat patients near certain death, etc. However, we also cannot exclude that
those expenses may improve the quality of lives of many cancer patients without statistically
changing their life expectancy and thus without having effects on mortality rate. We noted
these and other problems in explaining the lack of a statistically significant change in mortality
associated with higher spending on new drugs. Further work to explore these issues is necessary
to improve the efficiency of spending on cancer treatments.
26
References
Angelis, R.D., the EUROCARE-5 Working Group, 2014. Cancer survival in Europe 1999–
2007 by country and age: results of EUROCARE-5—a population-based study. The Lancet
Oncology 15, 23–34.
Cutler, D.M., 2008. Are we finally winning the war on cancer? Journal of Economic Perspectives
22, 3–26.
Dunn, A., 2012. Drug innovations and welfare measures computed from market demand: The
case of anti-cholesterol drugs. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4, 167–89.
Howard, D.H., Bach, P.B., Berndt, E.R., Conti, R.M., 2015. Pricing in the market for anticancer
drugs. Journal of Economic Perspectives 29, 139–162.
Howard, D.H., Chernew, M., Abdelgawad, T., Sollano, J., Smith, G., Grabowski, D., 2016. The
value of new anticancer drugs.
IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2014. Global outlook for medicines through 2018.
Jo¨nsson, B., Wilking, N., 2007. Summary. Annals of Oncology 18, ii2–ii7.
Lakdawalla, D.N., Sun, E.C., Jena, A.B., Reyes, C.M., Goldman, D.P., Philipson, T.J., 2010.
An economic evaluation of the war on cancer. Journal of Health Economics 29, 333 – 346.
Lichtenberg, F.R., 2004. The expanding pharmaceutical arsenal in the war on cancer. Technical
Report 10328. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lichtenberg, F.R., 2010. Are increasing 5-year survival rates evidence of success against cancer?
a reexamination using data from the US and Australia. Forum for Health Economics and
Policy 13.
Lichtenberg, F.R., 2012. Contribution of pharmaceutical innovation to longevity growth in
Germany and France, 2001-7. Pharmacoeconomics 30, 197–211.
Lichtenberg, F.R., 2014. Has medical innovation reduced cancer mortality? CESifo Economic
Studies 60, 135–177.
Lichtenberg, F.R., 2015. The impact of pharmaceutical innovation on premature cancer mor-
tality in canada, 20002011. International Journal of Health Economics and Management 15,
339359.
27
Lichtenberg, F.R., 2016a. The impact of pharmaceutical innovation on cancer mortality in
belgium, 20042012. Forum for Health Economics and Policy .
Lichtenberg, F.R., 2016b. The impact of pharmaceutical innovation on premature cancer mor-
tality in switzerland, 19952012. European Journal of Health Economics 17, 833854.
Petrin, A., 2002. Quantifying the benefits of new products: The case of the minivan. Journal
of Political Economy 110, 705–729.
Philipson, T., Eber, M., Darius, Corral, M., Conti, R., Goldman, D.P., 2012. An analysis of
whether higher health care spending in the United States versus Europe is ‘worth it’ in the
case of cancer. Health Affairs 31, 667–675.
Soneji, S., Yang, J., 2014. New analysis reexamines the value of cancer care in the United States
compared to western Europe. Health Affairs 34, 390–399.
Viscusi, K., Aldy, J., 2003. The value of a statistical life: A critical review of market estimates
throughout the world. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27, 5–76.
28
A Mortality reduction and implied cost per statistical life
A.1 Calculation of lives gained
We have estimated a cancer mortality equation as follows:
ln yist = αis + δt + γxist + βdist + εist
where yist denote the age-standardized mortality rate by cancer site s for country i at year t
and αis is a country-cancer site fixed effect, δt is a year effect, xist are observable variables such
as the country-cancer site age standardized incidence rate in year t, and dist is the number of
new drugs used and approved for each cancer site, country and year.
For example, if the policy counterfactual starts at date t0 then the counterfactual population
at the beginning of date t0 + 1 will be
P ∗it0+1 = Pit0+1 +
(
zist0 − z∗ist0
)
= Pit0+1 +
(
yist0 − y∗ist0
)× Pit0
= Pit0+1 +
(
yist0 − exp
(
ln yist0 − β∆∗ist0
))× Pit0
= Pit0+1 + yist0
(
1− e−β∆∗ist0
)
× Pit0
where ∆∗ist0 = (dist − d∗ist).
Then at year t0 + 2, the counterfactual population will depend on the t0 + 1 counterfactual
population in the same way if we can assume that the mortality model estimated in the data
would be valid for the counterfactual population. This would clearly be valid for the part of the
population not affected by the change in cancer mortality rate but is a stronger assumption for
the cancer patients.
P ∗it0+2 = Pit0+2 + yist0+1
(
1− e−β∆∗ist0+1
)
× P ∗it0+1
= Pit0+2 + yist0+1
(
1− e−β∆∗ist0+1
)
× Pit0+1 + yist0+1 × yist0
(
1− e−β∆∗ist0+1
)(
1− e−β∆∗ist0
)
× Pit0
= Pit0+2 +
∑1
k=0
Pit0+k ×
(∏1−k
n=0
yist0+1−n
(
1− e−β∆∗ist0+1−n
))
And for any T :
P ∗it0+T = Pit0+T +
∑T−1
k=0
(∏T−k−1
n=0
yist0+T−n−1
(
1− e−β∆∗ist0+T−n+1
))
Pit0+k
' Pit0+T
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if β and ∆∗ist are not too large and yist is also not too large which is typically the case for cancer
mortality and for the counterfactual policy considered.
A.2 Testing the robustness to lags
Table A1 shows the results of the estimates of βˆlk for different values of l and k when estimating
the effects of the numbers of new drugs on mortality for both genders. With 0 to 4 years of lag
for the endogenous variable (l = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4), the coefficients βˆlk are significantly different from
zero for k = 0 to 5. In all these cases, we cannot reject the fact that all βˆlk for k = 0 to 5 are
all equal for each given l. We thus cannot reject that the correct number of years of lags τ is
0, 1, 2, 3, 4. For l = 5, we have significantly results for k = 0, 1, 2 only while results become all
insignificant with 6 years of lag for l.
Table A1: Estimates of coefficient β with different lags, Both
Incidence Lags (l) Instrumental variables Lags (k)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 -0.120 -0.117 -0.108 -0.092 -0.077 -0.066 -0.045 -0.018 0.004
0.037 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.030
1 -0.136 -0.134 -0.121 -0.106 -0.086 -0.070 -0.052 -0.016 0.002
0.043 0.043 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.034
2 -0.170 -0.171 -0.162 -0.145 -0.125 -0.103 -0.072 -0.034 -0.018
0.054 0.055 0.053 0.051 0.049 0.047 0.045 0.044 0.043
3 -0.203 -0.208 -0.197 -0.191 -0.160 -0.146 -0.114 -0.077 -0.054
0.067 0.068 0.066 0.066 0.061 0.059 0.056 0.053 0.052
4 -0.208 -0.213 -0.209 -0.202 -0.188 -0.166 -0.135 -0.096 -0.057
0.081 0.083 0.083 0.081 0.079 0.076 0.072 0.068 0.065
5 -0.172 -0.181 -0.177 -0.179 -0.153 -0.142 -0.108 -0.064 -0.058
0.086 0.089 0.090 0.089 0.085 0.082 0.079 0.077 0.074
6 -0.079 -0.097 -0.090 -0.092 -0.083 -0.056 -0.053 -0.017 -0.016
0.096 0.099 0.097 0.097 0.094 0.092 0.090 0.089 0.088
Note: Standard errors below coefficients.
Table A2 shows the results of the estimates of βˆlk for different values of l and k when
estimating the effects of the numbers of new drugs on mortality for males. With 0 to 3 years
of lag for the endogenous variable (l = 0, 1, 2, 3), the coefficients βˆlk are significantly different
from zero for k = 0 and 1 only when l ≤ 1 but also for k = 2 and 3 when l = 2 or 3. In all these
cases, we cannot reject the fact that all βˆlk for k = 0 to 3 are all equal for each given l. We
thus cannot reject that the correct number of years of lags τ is 0, 1, 2, 3. For l = 4, 5, 6, results
become all insignificant.
Table A3 shows the results of the estimates of βˆlk for different values of l and k when
estimating the effects of the numbers of new drugs on mortality for females. With 0 to 4 years
of lag for the endogenous variable (l = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4), the coefficients βˆlk are significantly different
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Table A2: Estimates of coefficient β with different lags, Male
Incidence Lags (l) Instrumental variables Lags (k)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 -0.082 -0.077 -0.069 -0.057 -0.037 -0.022 -0.015 -0.001 0.014
0.040 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.035
1 -0.101 -0.094 -0.082 -0.070 -0.046 -0.023 -0.020 -0.004 0.013
0.046 0.046 0.044 0.044 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.039
2 -0.129 -0.127 -0.115 -0.103 -0.075 -0.045 -0.033 -0.020 0.002
0.058 0.058 0.056 0.055 0.052 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.049
3 -0.166 -0.164 -0.152 -0.151 -0.112 -0.088 -0.078 -0.051 -0.035
0.071 0.071 0.069 0.069 0.064 0.062 0.062 0.059 0.058
4 -0.153 -0.151 -0.145 -0.142 -0.134 -0.094 -0.093 -0.077 -0.040
0.084 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.077 0.078 0.075 0.072
5 -0.138 -0.132 -0.124 -0.129 -0.107 -0.102 -0.093 -0.072 -0.062
0.092 0.091 0.092 0.092 0.089 0.088 0.089 0.087 0.084
6 -0.033 -0.041 -0.038 -0.046 -0.045 -0.017 -0.031 -0.040 -0.039
0.102 0.102 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.100
Note: Standard errors below coefficients.
from zero for k = 0, 1, 2 and for k = 3 only when l = 2, 3, 4 but also for k = 4 when l = 3 or 4.
In all these cases, we cannot reject the fact that all βˆlk significantly different from zero are all
equal for each given l. We thus cannot reject that the correct number of years of lags τ is 0, 1,
2, 3, 4. For l = 5, 6, results become all insignificant.
Table A3: Estimates of coefficient β with different lags, Female
Incidence Lags (l) Instrumental variables Lags (k)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 -0.093 -0.091 -0.078 -0.062 -0.050 -0.040 -0.013 0.013 0.023
0.039 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.036
1 -0.103 -0.107 -0.091 -0.074 -0.058 -0.043 -0.015 0.023 0.024
0.045 0.045 0.044 0.043 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.040
2 -0.133 -0.136 -0.134 -0.112 -0.093 -0.078 -0.039 0.011 0.017
0.056 0.056 0.056 0.054 0.052 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.050
3 -0.165 -0.174 -0.173 -0.160 -0.135 -0.116 -0.071 -0.043 -0.009
0.068 0.070 0.070 0.068 0.065 0.065 0.060 0.060 0.060
4 -0.191 -0.202 -0.204 -0.192 -0.177 -0.167 -0.102 -0.048 -0.022
0.086 0.089 0.090 0.088 0.086 0.086 0.078 0.075 0.075
5 -0.174 -0.204 -0.220 -0.212 -0.191 -0.195 -0.109 -0.074 -0.042
0.101 0.109 0.115 0.113 0.109 0.109 0.095 0.094 0.091
6 -0.208 -0.252 -0.259 -0.247 -0.216 -0.213 -0.106 -0.054 -0.039
0.145 0.158 0.162 0.158 0.148 0.148 0.123 0.116 0.118
Note: Standard errors below coefficients.
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B First Stage Regressions
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Table B1: First stage results using count of new drugs
Both Men Women
Nb new drugs Nb new drugs Nb new drugs
b/se b/se b/se
Incidence x Austria −0.510∗∗∗ −0.426∗∗ −0.559∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.185) (0.175)
Incidence x Croatia −0.128 −0.184 −0.074
(0.356) (0.341) (0.294)
Incidence x Czech Republic −0.282 −0.264 −0.299
(0.405) (0.401) (0.335)
Incidence x France −0.119 0.080 −0.429∗
(0.215) (0.207) (0.221)
Incidence x Germany −1.055 −1.183∗ −0.345
(0.691) (0.659) (0.501)
Incidence x Ireland 0.246 0.108 0.103
(0.201) (0.186) (0.175)
Incidence x Norway 0.073 −0.291 0.003
(0.219) (0.191) (0.184)
Incidence x Sweden −0.382 −0.339 −0.434
(0.311) (0.293) (0.265)
Incidence x Switzerland −0.119 −0.225 0.081
(0.289) (0.235) (0.199)
Incidence x UK −1.327∗∗∗ −1.285∗∗∗ −1.210∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table B1: First stage results using count of new drugs
Both Men Women
Nb new drugs Nb new drugs Nb new drugs
b/se b/se b/se
(0.344) (0.349) (0.369)
Incidence x US −1.001∗∗∗ −0.918∗∗∗ −0.395
(0.239) (0.234) (0.266)
Other new drugs x Austria 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other new drugs x Croatia −0.004∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Other new drugs x Czech −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
Republic (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other new drugs x France 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other new drugs x Germany −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other new drugs x Ireland −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other new drugs x Norway −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other new drugs x Sweden −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Continued on next page
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Table B1: First stage results using count of new drugs
Both Men Women
Nb new drugs Nb new drugs Nb new drugs
b/se b/se b/se
Other new drugs x 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
Switzerland (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other new drugs x UK −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other new drugs x US 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Average launch delay for 0.215 0.270 0.203
non-cancer drugs (0.403) (0.443) (0.433)
N 6028 5382 5521
F-stat for under ID 54.90 50.84 55.88
F-stat for weak ID 4.58 4.24 4.67
Sargan statistic 71.11 79.90 21.69
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p< .01.
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Table B2: First stage results using Log spending
Both Men Women
Log(spend), new Log(spend), old Log(spend), new Log(spend), old Log(spend), new Log(spend), old
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Incidence x Austria 0.494 −0.237 0.334 −0.218∗ 0.208 −0.186
(0.592) (0.147) (0.562) (0.132) (0.575) (0.142)
Incidence x Croatia 0.549 0.126 0.180 0.322 0.385 −0.156
(1.497) (0.371) (1.212) (0.285) (0.913) (0.225)
Incidence x Czech Republic −0.060 0.087 0.094 0.153 −0.594 −0.176
(0.791) (0.196) (0.762) (0.179) (0.665) (0.164)
Incidence x France 1.683∗∗∗ 0.233 1.867∗∗∗ 0.192 0.839 −0.118
(0.600) (0.149) (0.556) (0.131) (0.588) (0.145)
Incidence x Germany −2.732∗∗ 0.661∗∗ −2.368∗∗ 0.105 −1.515∗ 0.474∗∗
(1.120) (0.278) (1.071) (0.252) (0.818) (0.202)
Incidence x Ireland 0.266 −0.361 0.371 −0.029 −0.170 −0.207
(1.474) (0.366) (1.050) (0.247) (0.936) (0.231)
Incidence x Norway 0.616 −0.141 0.794 −0.009 0.046 −0.095
(0.678) (0.168) (0.564) (0.133) (0.553) (0.136)
Incidence x Sweden 1.205 −0.801∗∗∗ 1.095 −0.545∗∗∗ 0.085 −0.581∗∗∗
(0.760) (0.189) (0.679) (0.159) (0.613) (0.151)
Incidence x Switzerland 0.179 −0.297∗ 0.412 −0.350∗∗∗ −0.115 −0.010
(0.650) (0.161) (0.564) (0.132) (0.400) (0.098)
Incidence x UK 1.290 −0.703∗∗ 0.625 −0.365 2.072 −0.616
Continued on next page
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Table B2: First stage results using Log spending
Both Men Women
Log(spend), new Log(spend), old Log(spend), new Log(spend), old Log(spend), new Log(spend), old
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
(1.441) (0.358) (1.320) (0.310) (1.563) (0.385)
Incidence x US 6.807∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗ 5.404∗∗∗ 0.189 6.753∗∗∗ 0.415∗
(0.825) (0.205) (0.768) (0.180) (0.902) (0.222)
Other new drugs x Austria −0.001 0.002 −0.000 0.003∗ −0.000 0.003
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
Other new drugs x Croatia −0.008 0.004∗ −0.007 0.004 −0.008 0.004
(0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Other new drugs x Czech −0.006 −0.000 −0.006 −0.000 −0.004 −0.000
Republic (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
Other new drugs x France 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
Other new drugs x Germany −0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002∗ 0.000 0.002
(0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
Other new drugs x Ireland −0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Other new drugs x Norway −0.006 0.001 −0.005 0.001 −0.005 0.001
(0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
Other new drugs x Sweden −0.003 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
Continued on next page
37
Table B2: First stage results using Log spending
Both Men Women
Log(spend), new Log(spend), old Log(spend), new Log(spend), old Log(spend), new Log(spend), old
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Other new drugs x −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
Switzerland (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Other new drugs x UK −0.001 0.002 −0.000 0.002 −0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
Other new drugs x US −0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Average launch delay for 2.190 −0.783∗∗ 2.145 −0.681∗ 2.378 −0.687
non-cancer drugs (1.591) (0.395) (1.757) (0.413) (1.729) (0.426)
Exchange rate, e 0.066 0.024 0.065 0.019 0.086 0.026
(0.095) (0.024) (0.105) (0.025) (0.103) (0.025)
Exchange rate, USD −0.587 −0.603∗∗∗ −0.657 −0.642∗∗∗ −0.472 −0.633∗∗
(0.929) (0.231) (1.025) (0.241) (1.008) (0.248)
N 3318 3318 2964 2964 3035 3035
F-stat for under ID 25.19 23.22 22.50
F-stat for weak ID 1.79 1.65 1.60
Sargan statistic 22.57 28.86 13.56
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p< .01.
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C Age-standardized mortality rates
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D Counterfactuals by gender
Table D1: Counterfactual 1 by cancer, Men Only
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Bladder 23.77 7.79 7.79 0.42 9.98 23.63
Bone 1.22 0.73 0.73 0.00 8.23 .
Breast 0.92 0.31 0.35 1.64 2980.33 1817.72
CNS 8.11 6.43 7.16 23.57 2102.04 89.17
Cervix uteri . . . . . .
Colon 35.66 17.36 18.83 65.99 8514.62 129.04
Corpus uteri . . . . . .
Endocrine glands 0.54 0.32 0.32 -0.00 0.00 .
Eye 0.97 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.00 .
Gallbladder 3.13 2.07 2.07 -0.00 0.00 .
Hodgkin lymphoma 2.73 0.46 0.46 0.11 14.42 127.98
Kidney 17.40 7.34 8.55 48.04 7454.87 155.18
Larynx 6.91 3.00 3.00 -0.00 0.00 .
Leukaemia 12.88 7.33 9.10 113.06 11905.18 105.30
Lip 1.20 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 .
Liver 9.56 8.27 8.55 12.56 350.27 27.89
Lung 64.24 55.98 61.93 356.35 23735.17 66.61
Multiple myeloma 5.98 3.69 3.93 13.25 1585.90 119.69
Non-Hodgkin lymphoma 14.99 6.08 6.63 46.70 4692.69 100.48
Nose & sinuses 0.85 0.27 0.27 -0.00 0.00 .
Oesophagus 8.77 7.59 7.59 -0.00 0.00 .
Oral cavity 3.39 1.19 1.19 0.00 0.00 .
Other female sites . . . . . .
Other skin 68.39 0.97 0.97 -0.00 5.74 .
Ovary . . . . . .
Pancreas 12.19 12.07 13.67 48.24 2256.38 46.78
Penis 1.14 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.00 .
Pharynx 7.23 3.70 3.70 -0.00 0.00 .
Prostate 121.07 26.50 26.82 20.30 762.63 37.57
Rectum 24.92 9.83 10.54 21.77 4874.93 223.88
Salivary glands 1.06 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.00 .
Skin melanoma 16.54 3.63 3.64 1.15 391.02 339.40
Small intestine 1.80 0.58 0.58 -0.00 0.00 .
Soft tissue 3.03 1.13 1.14 0.24 111.27 458.56
Stomach 15.59 10.63 11.70 27.10 9811.36 362.01
Testis 7.41 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 .
Thyroid gland 3.14 0.48 0.50 0.66 115.98 175.24
Tongue 3.40 1.46 1.46 -0.00 0.00 .
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Table D2: Counterfactual 1 by country, Men Only
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Austria 13.30 5.88 6.40 8.59 1211.94 141.11
Croatia 13.52 8.43 8.75 2.77 199.41 71.99
Czech Republic 18.46 8.12 8.45 6.86 603.63 87.97
France 12.29 6.20 6.90 86.32 10122.53 117.26
Germany 15.76 5.99 6.55 89.95 9770.82 108.63
Ireland 18.48 6.17 6.50 3.00 375.22 125.18
Norway 13.26 5.59 5.87 2.72 280.74 103.21
Sweden 12.08 4.87 5.21 6.51 855.26 131.39
Switzerland 14.29 5.25 5.73 7.24 1226.46 169.34
UK 14.16 5.60 6.03 49.17 2591.43 52.71
US 15.69 5.35 6.22 538.04 54445.57 101.19
Table D3: Counterfactual 1 by cancer, Women Only
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Bladder 6.11 2.18 2.18 0.16 7.39 47.48
Bone 0.90 0.42 0.42 0.00 8.23 .
Breast 105.64 24.81 27.84 150.34 3553.98 23.64
CNS 5.74 4.31 4.88 18.68 1762.95 94.39
Cervix uteri 10.06 2.91 2.99 3.44 1881.77 546.93
Colon 24.93 11.10 12.20 54.55 9525.27 174.61
Corpus uteri 18.83 2.43 2.43 0.00 0.00 .
Endocrine glands 0.50 0.27 0.27 -0.00 0.00 .
Eye 0.78 0.14 0.14 -0.00 0.00 .
Gallbladder 3.58 2.60 2.60 0.00 0.00 .
Hodgkin lymphoma 2.13 0.30 0.30 0.08 13.88 177.69
Kidney 8.42 3.17 3.77 24.83 4935.63 198.80
Larynx 0.85 0.31 0.31 -0.00 0.00 .
Leukaemia 7.85 4.28 5.48 79.56 12583.86 158.18
Lip 0.36 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.00 .
Liver 3.20 3.19 3.31 5.43 176.20 32.46
Lung 27.71 22.41 25.56 240.75 21082.53 87.57
Multiple myeloma 3.96 2.45 2.62 10.24 1692.71 165.26
Non-Hodgkin lymphoma 10.66 3.89 4.29 34.42 4678.85 135.93
Nose & sinuses 0.44 0.13 0.13 -0.00 0.00 .
Oesophagus 2.30 1.92 1.92 0.00 0.00 .
Oral cavity 1.33 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 .
Other female sites 3.63 3.14 3.14 0.00 0.00 .
Other skin 46.13 0.42 0.42 0.00 5.74 .
Ovary 14.34 8.93 8.97 1.88 95.72 51.01
Pancreas 8.93 8.78 10.15 42.18 2545.96 60.36
Penis . . . . . .
Pharynx 1.51 0.66 0.66 -0.00 0.00 .
Prostate . . . . . .
Rectum 13.79 4.98 5.41 14.92 4479.35 300.22
Salivary glands 0.67 0.17 0.17 -0.00 0.00 .
Skin melanoma 15.22 2.15 2.16 0.61 391.02 636.25
Small intestine 1.20 0.38 0.38 -0.00 0.00 .
Soft tissue 2.30 0.85 0.86 0.23 15.54 68.16
Stomach 7.41 5.07 5.67 15.80 8994.46 569.15
Testis . . . . . .
Thyroid gland 8.80 0.56 0.58 0.79 433.68 549.84
Tongue 1.15 0.39 0.39 -0.00 0.00 .
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Table D4: Counterfactual 1 by country, Women Only
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Austria 8.85 3.56 3.98 7.54 1178.06 156.32
Croatia 8.56 3.95 4.11 1.53 194.03 127.04
Czech Republic 12.39 4.37 4.57 4.52 586.06 129.78
France 7.23 3.11 3.64 72.06 9907.71 137.49
Germany 10.86 3.62 4.02 69.15 9471.11 136.96
Ireland 13.63 4.27 4.54 2.38 367.37 154.07
Norway 10.31 3.82 4.08 2.53 272.11 107.53
Sweden 9.37 3.60 3.97 7.06 846.53 119.89
Switzerland 10.04 3.18 3.52 5.64 1187.08 210.40
UK 11.19 3.92 4.30 46.57 2564.79 55.08
US 11.76 3.74 4.49 479.90 52289.87 108.96
Table D5: Counterfactual 2 by cancer, Men Only
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Bladder 23.77 7.79 7.70 -2.53 99.84 39.49
Bone 1.22 0.73 0.73 0.00 8.23 .
Breast 0.92 0.31 0.28 -0.48 382.09 802.69
CNS 8.11 6.43 6.12 -6.35 367.86 57.96
Cervix uteri . . . . . .
Colon 35.66 17.36 16.30 -11.53 1601.45 138.86
Corpus uteri . . . . . .
Endocrine glands 0.54 0.32 0.32 -0.00 0.00 .
Eye 0.97 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.00 .
Gallbladder 3.13 2.07 2.07 -0.00 0.00 .
Hodgkin lymphoma 2.73 0.46 0.46 -0.08 144.16 1879.21
Kidney 17.40 7.34 6.77 -7.97 3742.40 469.31
Larynx 6.91 3.00 3.00 -0.00 0.00 .
Leukaemia 12.88 7.33 5.78 -14.81 6415.23 433.19
Lip 1.20 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 .
Liver 9.56 8.27 8.15 -1.17 140.11 119.81
Lung 64.24 55.98 48.65 -90.79 6785.79 74.74
Multiple myeloma 5.98 3.69 3.51 -1.79 1471.46 822.73
Non-Hodgkin lymphoma 14.99 6.08 4.99 -14.42 5993.47 415.73
Nose & sinuses 0.85 0.27 0.27 -0.00 0.00 .
Oesophagus 8.77 7.59 7.59 -0.00 0.00 .
Oral cavity 3.39 1.19 1.19 0.00 0.00 .
Other female sites . . . . . .
Other skin 68.39 0.97 0.97 -0.00 5.74 .
Ovary . . . . . .
Pancreas 12.19 12.07 11.76 -10.82 209.20 19.34
Penis 1.14 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.00 .
Pharynx 7.23 3.70 3.70 -0.00 0.00 .
Prostate 121.07 26.50 25.87 -6.62 114.26 17.25
Rectum 24.92 9.83 9.11 -8.54 1928.14 225.81
Salivary glands 1.06 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.00 .
Skin melanoma 16.54 3.63 3.59 -0.45 1329.46 2933.81
Small intestine 1.80 0.58 0.58 -0.00 0.00 .
Soft tissue 3.03 1.13 1.11 -0.87 588.12 675.98
Stomach 15.59 10.63 10.47 -0.51 223.77 436.15
Testis 7.41 0.38 0.37 -0.05 0.00 .
Thyroid gland 3.14 0.48 0.48 -0.06 46.39 799.29
Tongue 3.40 1.46 1.46 -0.00 0.00 .
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Table D6: Counterfactual 2 by country, Men Only
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Austria 13.30 5.88 5.59 -4.81 304.53 63.29
Croatia 13.52 8.43 7.32 -9.48 164.37 17.33
Czech Republic 18.46 8.12 7.27 -17.54 384.98 21.94
France 12.29 6.20 5.98 -27.63 1479.81 53.56
Germany 15.76 5.99 5.73 -43.33 1498.50 34.58
Ireland 18.48 6.17 5.69 -4.31 176.75 41.05
Norway 13.26 5.59 5.17 -4.10 104.56 25.52
Sweden 12.08 4.87 4.59 -5.20 242.87 46.73
Switzerland 14.29 5.25 5.01 -3.66 340.09 92.84
UK 14.16 5.60 5.19 -46.23 831.30 17.98
US 15.69 5.35 5.32 -13.54 1596.87 117.92
Table D7: Counterfactual 2 by cancer, Women Only
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Bladder 6.11 2.18 2.15 -0.84 73.88 88.23
Bone 0.90 0.42 0.42 0.00 8.23 .
Breast 105.64 24.81 22.36 -45.83 455.64 9.94
CNS 5.74 4.31 4.07 -4.92 308.52 62.77
Cervix uteri 10.06 2.91 2.79 -1.78 642.56 361.75
Colon 24.93 11.10 10.36 -8.83 1791.53 202.81
Corpus uteri 18.83 2.43 2.43 0.00 0.00 .
Endocrine glands 0.50 0.27 0.27 -0.00 0.00 .
Eye 0.78 0.14 0.14 -0.00 0.00 .
Gallbladder 3.58 2.60 2.60 0.00 0.00 .
Hodgkin lymphoma 2.13 0.30 0.30 -0.06 138.78 2399.83
Kidney 8.42 3.17 2.91 -4.06 2477.73 610.68
Larynx 0.85 0.31 0.31 -0.00 0.00 .
Leukaemia 7.85 4.28 3.28 -10.09 6780.94 672.24
Lip 0.36 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.00 .
Liver 3.20 3.19 3.14 -0.49 70.48 142.98
Lung 27.71 22.41 19.41 -42.18 6027.41 142.89
Multiple myeloma 3.96 2.45 2.30 -1.42 1570.55 1106.30
Non-Hodgkin lymphoma 10.66 3.89 3.12 -10.47 5975.79 570.52
Nose & sinuses 0.44 0.13 0.13 -0.00 0.00 .
Oesophagus 2.30 1.92 1.92 0.00 0.00 .
Oral cavity 1.33 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 .
Other female sites 3.63 3.14 3.14 0.00 0.00 .
Other skin 46.13 0.42 0.42 0.00 5.74 .
Ovary 14.34 8.93 8.65 -6.22 12.00 1.93
Pancreas 8.93 8.78 8.54 -9.31 236.05 25.36
Penis . . . . . .
Pharynx 1.51 0.66 0.66 -0.00 0.00 .
Prostate . . . . . .
Rectum 13.79 4.98 4.58 -5.12 1771.68 345.82
Salivary glands 0.67 0.17 0.17 -0.00 0.00 .
Skin melanoma 15.22 2.15 2.12 -0.31 1329.46 4258.87
Small intestine 1.20 0.38 0.38 -0.00 0.00 .
Soft tissue 2.30 0.85 0.83 -0.80 82.15 103.31
Stomach 7.41 5.07 5.00 -0.27 205.14 755.29
Testis . . . . . .
Thyroid gland 8.80 0.56 0.55 -0.08 173.47 2043.25
Tongue 1.15 0.39 0.39 -0.00 0.00 .
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Table D8: Counterfactual 2 by country, Women Only
ASMR Change in Spending Cost per
ASIR Observed Counterfactual lives (1000s) (millions) Life (1000s)
Austria 8.85 3.56 3.37 -3.34 292.08 87.54
Croatia 8.56 3.95 3.42 -5.05 165.02 32.68
Czech Republic 12.39 4.37 3.92 -10.08 347.43 34.47
France 7.23 3.11 2.98 -17.18 1391.87 81.00
Germany 10.86 3.62 3.41 -35.87 1529.95 42.66
Ireland 13.63 4.27 3.87 -3.85 167.05 43.43
Norway 10.31 3.82 3.47 -3.45 103.47 29.96
Sweden 9.37 3.60 3.36 -4.68 236.74 50.59
Switzerland 10.04 3.18 2.97 -3.26 319.21 97.92
UK 11.19 3.92 3.56 -42.98 844.39 19.65
US 11.76 3.74 3.71 -23.35 1790.75 76.70
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